A social Bayesian brain: how social knowledge can shape visual perception by Otten, Marte et al.
A social Bayesian brain: how social knowledge can shape 
visual perception
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Otten, Marte, Seth, Anil K and Pinto, Yair (2017) A social Bayesian brain: how social knowledge 
can shape visual perception. Brain and Cognition, 112. pp. 69-77. ISSN 0278-2626 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/61149/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
	 1	
A	social	Bayesian	brain:	how	social	knowledge	can	shape	visual	perception	
Marte	Otten
1,2
,	Anil	K.	Seth
1
	&	Yair	Pinto
1,2
	
1
Sackler	Centre	for	Consciousness	Science,	University	of	Sussex,	Brighton,	BN1	9QJ,	United	
Kingdom	
2
University	of	Amsterdam,	Brain	&	Cognition,	The	Netherlands	
	
	 	
	 2	
Abstract	
A	growing	body	of	research	suggests	that	social	contextual	factors	such	as	desires	and	goals,	
affective	 states	 and	 stereotypes	 can	 shape	early	 perceptual	 processes.	We	 suggest	 that	 a	
generative	 Bayesian	 approach	 towards	 perception	 provides	 a	 powerful	 theoretical	
framework	 to	 accommodate	 how	 such	 high-level	 social	 factors	 can	 influence	 low-level	
perceptual	 processes	 in	 their	 earliest	 stages.	We	 review	 experimental	 findings	 that	 show	
how	 social	 factors	 shape	 the	 perception	 and	 evaluation	 of	 people,	 behavior,	 and	 socially	
relevant	 objects	 or	 information.	 Subsequently,	 we	 summarize	 the	 generative	 view	 of	
perception	within	the	‘Bayesian	brain’,	and	show	how	such	a	framework	can	account	for	the	
pervasive	effects	of	 top-down	social	knowledge	on	social	 cognition.	Finally,	we	sketch	 the	
theoretical	 and	 experimental	 implications	 of	 social	 predictive	 perception,	 indicating	 new	
directions	for	research	on	the	effects	and	neurocognitive	underpinnings	of	social	cognition.	
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Humans	are	intensely	social	animals:	social	 interaction	in	all	shapes	and	sizes	forms	a	core	
aspect	of	our	existence.	The	things	we	know,	both	consciously	(explicitly)	and	unconsciously	
(implicitly),	 about	 other	 people	 helps	 us	 to	 swiftly	 interpret	 their	 behaviour	 and	 respond	
appropriately.	In	recent	years,	evidence	has	mounted	that	social	knowledge	shapes	not	just	
how	we	interpret	the	world	around	us,	but	also	how	we	perceive	it	(see	for	example	Barrett	
&	 Bar,	 2009).	 Research	 from	 experimental	 social	 psychology	 focussing	 mainly	 on	 visual	
perception	suggests	that	social	contextual	factors	can	subtly	but	substantially	change	how	a	
stimulus	 is	 processed,	 which	 in	 turn	 changes	 the	 percept	 that	 people	 experience.	 In	 this	
paper,	we	provide	an	overview	of	the	experimental	evidence	that	social	contextual	factors	
such	 as	 goals,	 desires,	 emotions,	 social	 interpersonal	 knowledge	 and	 stereotypes	 can	
significantly	 influence	 even	 the	 earliest	 stages	 of	 perception.	 Even	 though	 social	
psychologists	 have	made	 great	 strides	 in	 uncovering	 these	 early	 perceptual	 influences	 of	
social	context,	within	social	psychology	there	has	been	a	 lack	of	theoretical	frameworks	 in	
which	these	findings	can	be	organised.	Standard	models	of	human	perception	emphasize	a	
bottom-up	elaboration	of	sensory	information,	which	imply	that	higher-level	factors	such	as	
social	context	only	have	a	 role	 in	 later	stages,	after	 the	corresponding	perceptual	content	
has	been	established.	Here,	we	explore	how	“predictive	perception”,	based	on	the	view	of	
the	human	brain	as	a	pro-active	Bayesian	hypothesis	tester,	provides	a	powerful	theoretical	
framework	in	which	to	assimilate	the	body	of	experimental	findings	from	social	psychology	
that	 is	 now	 emerging.	 A	 key	 feature	 of	 this	 framework	 is	 its	 emphasis	 on	 bidirectional	
influences	between	incoming	sensory	data	and	prior	expectations	about	the	causes	of	this	
data	 (Clark,	 2013;	 Friston,	 2010a;	 Hohwy,	 2013;	 Seth,	 2013).	 This	 allows	 researchers	
studying	 social	 cognition	 to	 frame	questions	 about	whether	 social	 context	 directly	 affects	
perceptual	content,	or	whether	it	(merely)	alters	post-perceptual	processes.	In	this	way,	this	
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framework	 provides	 a	 strong	 basis	 from	 which	 to	 derive	 new,	 testable	 hypotheses	 that	
stand	to	substantially	enrich	the	field	of	social	psychological	research.	
	
1. Social	perception	
The	 idea	that	high-level	social	 factors	such	as	attitudes,	goals	and	stereotypes	can	change	
low	 level	 perceptual	 processes	 is	 not	 new.	 In	 the	 mid-20
th
	 century	 the	 “New	 Look”	
movement	made	the	case	that	social	processes	critically	change	basic	cognitive	functioning	
(Bruner,	1992).	For	example,	Bruner	and	Goodman	(Bruner	&	Goodman,	1947)	showed	that	
children	 from	poor	homes	overestimated	 the	 size	of	 coins	 compared	 to	wealthy	 children.	
Unfortunately,	 in	 subsequent	 years,	 many	 of	 the	 New	 Look	 experiments	 were	 found	 to	
suffer	from	methodological	problems	(Eriksen,	1962;	McCurdy,	1956).	Moreover,	the	design	
of	 the	 experiments	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 separate	 true	 changes	 in	 perception	 (i.e.	 what	 a	
participant	sees)	 from	changes	 in	response	(i.e.	what	a	participant	says).	For	example,	 the	
Bruner	and	Goodman	result	could	be	completely	attributed	 to	post-perceptual	changes	 in	
how	a	poor	child	responds	to	coins,	but	not	how	the	child	perceives	the	coins,	a	so-called	
response	bias	 (Erdelyi,	1974).	 In	 the	 last	 two	decades	 researchers	have	 shown	a	 renewed	
appreciation	 for	 the	 ideas	of	 the	New	Look	scientists,	which	has	been	accompanied	by	an	
increasing	body	of	methodologically	 rigorous	empirical	 research.	Here,	we	will	 review	this	
body	of	research,	and	explore	whether	it	provides	evidence	for	true	changes	in	perception	
as	 a	 function	 of	 social	 context.	 To	 study	 perceptual	 processes,	 researchers	 can	 employ	
several	methods.	 Although	 asking	 people	 to	 report	 their	 (visual,	 auditory)	 experience	 can	
provide	insights	into	perception,	this	method	is	also	susceptible	to	the	response	biases	we	
described	earlier.	Another	self-report	method	that	seems	less	susceptible	to	response	biases	
uses	binocular	 rivalry.	 In	binocular	 rivalry,	different	 stimuli	are	presented	 to	 the	 right	and	
	 5	
the	 left	 eye	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Participants	 are	 generally	 only	 aware	 of	 one	 stimulus	 at	 a	
time,	which	means	that	the	two	stimuli	compete	for	conscious	access.	The	process	of	rivalry	
is	 thought	 to	 primarily	 reflect	 perceptual	 processes,	 where	 dominance	 is	 the	 result	 of	
competition	at	early	stages	of	visual	processing	(Blake,	2001;	Tong,	Meng,	&	Blake,	2006).	As	
such,	reported	changes	in	conscious	perception	in	a	binocular	rivalry	task	are	more	likely	to	
reflect	 actual	 changes	 in	 visual	 perception,	 rather	 than	 response	 bias	 (though	 see	 Alais,	
Keetels,	 &	 Freeman,	 2014).	 However,	 binocular	 rivalry	 can	 also	 be	 modified	 by	 shifts	 in	
attention	(Meng	&	Tong,	2004):	if	participants	focus	their	attention	on	specific	stimuli,	these	
stimuli	 are	 slightly	 more	 likely	 to	 enter	 awareness	 than	 unattended	 stimuli.	 Therefore,	
though	 suggestive,	 binocular	 rivalry	 studies	 do	 not	 provide	 definitive	 evidence	 that	 top-
down	social	knowledge	directly	shapes	visual	processing,	since	these	effects	can	be	(but	not	
necessarily	always	are)	influenced	by	attention.	Electrophysiological	studies	can	be	used	to	
unambiguously	 uncover	 direct	 effects	 of	 social	 context	 on	 perceptual	 contents,	 by	
examining	whether	early	neural	signatures	of	perceptual	processing	are	modulated	by	high-
level	 social	 knowledge.	 Combined,	 self-report,	 binocular	 rivalry	 (and	 other	 bistable	
perceptual	situations),	and	electrophysiological	data	can	provide	insights	into	whether	social	
context	can	indeed	change	perceptual	processes.		
	
Folk	psychology	often	stresses	that	people	see	what	they	want	or	expect	to	see.	This	notion	
is	increasingly	supported	by	studies	exploring	the	effects	of	expectations,	desires	and	goals	
on	 perception.	 For	 example,	 Balcetis	 &	 Dunning	 (2006)	 presented	 participants	 with	 an	
ambiguous	stimulus,	such	as	a	picture	that	can	be	seen	both	as	a	letter	(‘B’)	or	a	digit	(‘13’).	
Before	they	viewed	the	ambiguous	stimuli,	participants	were	trained	to	associate	digits	or	
letters	with	 a	 positive	 outcome	 in	 the	 form	 of	 pleasant	 food.	 On	 viewing	 the	 ambiguous	
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stimulus,	 participants	 overwhelmingly	 reported	 seeing	 the	 type	 of	 stimulus	 that	 was	
associated	with	the	positive	outcome.	Balcetis	and	colleagues	(Balcetis,	Dunning,	&	Granot,	
2012)	 linked	 letters	 to	 a	 financial	 reward,	 and	 numbers	 to	 financial	 loss.	 In	 a	 subsequent	
binocular	 rivalry	 task,	 letters	 more	 frequently	 achieved	 initial	 perceptual	 dominance,	
suggesting	 that	 the	 positive	 outcome	 associated	with	 one	 stimulus	 category	 changed	 the	
visual	 processing	 of	 exemplars	 from	 that	 category.	 Another	 binocular	 rivalry	 experiment	
that	 relied	 not	 on	 learned	 associations	 but	 on	 the	 strong	 intrinsic	 physiological	 goal	 of	
hunger	 (Radel	 &	 Clement-Guillotin,	 2012)	 showed	 that	 hungry	 participants	 showed	
preferences	in	bistable	perception	towards	items	related	to	food	than	non-food.	Finally,	to	
test	the	effects	of	prior	expectations	on	conscious	access,	Pinto	and	colleagues	(Pinto,	van	
Gaal,	 de	 Lange,	 Lamme,	 &	 Seth,	 2015)	 employed	 a	modified	 binocular	 rivalry	 task,	 a	 so-
called	‘breakthrough	against	continuous	flash	suppression’	paradigm.	In	this	paradigm,	one	
eye	 views	 constantly	 changing	Mondrian-style	 images	 (which	 initially	 dominate	 conscious	
perception),	while	the	other	eye	views	an	 image	of	an	object.	Pinto	and	colleagues	(2015)	
found	 that	 expected	 objects	 broke	 through	 the	 continuous	 flash	 suppression	 faster	 than	
unexpected,	or	neutral	objects	(see	also	Chang,	Kanai,	&	Seth,	2015;	Lupyan	&	Ward,	2013).	
Together,	findings	from	these	studies	suggest	that	participants	were	not	just	biased	towards	
reporting	 the	preferred	 stimuli,	 but	 actually	were	more	 likely	 to	perceive	 the	 stimuli	 that	
they	 wanted	 or	 expected	 to	 see.	 This	 shows	 that	 an	 individual’s	 goals,	 desires	 and	
expectations	can	influence	visual	perception	and	conscious	awareness.		
	
Several	studies	suggest	that	the	affective	state	of	the	observer	can	influence	perception.	For	
example,	 people	 who	 are	 in	 a	 positive	 mood,	 induced	 by	 happy	 music,	 are	 better	 at	
detecting	mood-congruent	than	mood-incongruent	faces	which	are	obscured	by	visual	noise	
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(Jolij	&	Meurs,	2011).	 In	a	binocular	rivalry	study	 in	which	one	eye	was	presented	with	an	
emotional	 face	 and	 the	other	with	 a	house,	 scowling	 faces	were	more	 likely	 to	dominate	
consciousness	compared	 to	smiling	 faces	when	 the	participant	was	 in	a	negative	affective	
state,	and	vice	versa	for	participants	in	a	positive	mood	(Anderson,	Siegel,	&	Barrett,	2011).	
Singer	 and	 colleagues	 (Singer,	 Eapen,	Grillon,	Ungerleider,	&	Hendler,	 2012)	 showed,	 in	 a	
binocular	rivalry	experiment,	that	patients	with	social	anxiety	or	panic	disorders	were	more	
likely	to	see	fearful	faces	(a	threat-related	stimulus)	when	the	face	competed	with	a	house	
for	 conscious	 access,	 as	 compared	 to	 healthy	 controls.	 Changes	 in	 the	 perception	 of	
emotionally	 relevant	 stimuli	 also	 occur	 when	 a	 participant’s	 emotional	 state	 is	 signalled	
indirectly,	through	(false)	cardiac	feedback:	When	participants	are	led	to	believe	that	their	
heartrate	 has	 increased,	 a	 sign	 of	 physical	 arousal,	 they	 perceive	 faces	 with	 a	 neutral	
expression	 as	more	emotionally	 intense	 (Gray,	Harrison,	Wiens,	&	Critchley,	 2007).	 Taken	
together,	these	studies	show	that	the	interoceptive	or	emotional	state	of	the	observer	can	
alter	what	she	reports	perceiving.	Importantly,	those	studies	using	binocular	rivalry	(Gray	et	
al.,	2012;	Singer	et	al.,	2012)	provide	additional	evidence	suggesting	that	these	changes	are	
perceptual.	Notably,	influences	of	affective	state	on	perception	are	not	limited	to	vision.	For	
example,	after	a	fearful	mood	induction	participants	perceive	sounds	as	louder	than	after	a	
neutral	mood	induction	(Siegel	&	Stefanucci,	2011).		
	
Social	 influences	on	visual	perception	are	not	 just	based	on	 the	goals,	desires	and	overall	
emotional	state	of	the	observer.	Specific	social	knowledge	related	to	a	particular	stimulus	or	
person	 can	 also	 directly	 affect	 perception.	 One	 interesting	 example	 from	 language	
perception	focusses	on	sarcasm	(Regel,	Coulson,	&	Gunter,	2010).	Statements	that	convey	
irony	or	sarcasm,	such	as	describing	a	day	spent	binge-watching	Netflix	as	‘very	productive’,	
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are	 known	 to	 evoke	 increased	 early	 syntactic	 processing	 (as	 indicated	 by	 the	 P600,	
Spotorno,	 Cheylus,	 Van	 Der	 Henst,	 &	 Noveck,	 2013).	 However,	 when	 participants	 know	
certain	individuals	to	often	speak	in	a	sarcastic	way,	their	ironic	statements	no	longer	evoke	
this	 relative	 increase	 in	 linguistic	processing	 (Regel	et	al.,	2010).	 In	 this	study,	participants	
were	not	asked	for	explicit	 judgements	or	responses	–	reducing	the	likelihood	of	response	
bias.	The	dependent	measure,	the	event-related	potential,	directly	reflects	neural	activation	
in	 response	 to	 stimuli,	 and	 the	 P600	 is	 known	 to	 index	 initial	 syntactic	 processing	 (Kaan,	
Harris,	Gibson,	&	Holcomb,	2000).	Therefore,	this	finding	indicates	that	a	listener	takes	into	
account	the	speaker’s	personality	in	the	very	first	steps	of	linguistic	processing.		
	
Visual	perception	of	others	also	 seems	 to	be	modulated	by	what	we	know	–	 specifically	 -	
about	 those	 others.	 Anderson	 and	 colleagues	 (Anderson,	 Siegel,	 Bliss-Moreau,	 &	 Barrett,	
2011)	have	shown	that	faces	that	have	been	associated	with	negative	information	(“Threw	a	
chair	at	his	classmate”)	are	preferentially	perceived	in	a	binocular	rivalry	setting,	over	faces	
that	were	associated	with	neutral	or	positive	information.	A	number	of	electrophysiological	
studies	 of	 face	 perception	 suggest	 that	 effects	 of	 social	 knowledge	 on	 face	 perception	
originate	early	in	the	visual	processing	stream.	For	example,	faces	associated	with	negative	
actions	 (for	example	 raping	a	woman)	evoke	a	 reduced	N170	compared	 to	 faces	 that	had	
positive	connotations	(for	example	saving	a	child,	Galli,	Feurra,	&	Viggiano,	2006).	Since	the	
N170	 is	 thought	 to	 reflect	 initial	 structural	 visual	encoding	 specifically	of	 faces,	 this	effect	
suggests	 that	 knowledge	 about	 individuals	 stored	 in	 memory	 directly	 alters	 early	 visual	
processing	of	their	faces.	Negative	and	positive	knowledge	about	a	face	also	influences	the	
Early	Posterior	Negativity	or	EPN	(Rahman,	2011;	Wieser	et	al.,	2014)	and	the	P100	(Rahman	
&	Sommer,	2012),	in	patterns	that	resemble	the	processing	of	faces	with	actual	negative	or	
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positive	emotional	expressions.	It	thus	seems	that	top-down	valence	information	stored	in,	
and	 retrieved	 from,	memory	can	have	similar	effects	as	bottom-up	sensory	visual	valence	
information	 on	 early	 electrophysiological	 processes	 underlying	 face	 perception.	 Taken	
together,	 the	 studies	 summarized	 above	 strongly	 suggest	 that	 knowing	 something	 about	
another	 person	 (that	 they	 are	 violent,	 sarcastic	 or	 happy)	 directly	 influences	 perceptual	
processing.	
	
Besides	 individual	 knowledge	 of	 others,	 group-based	 knowledge	 also	 plays	 an	 important	
role	in	shaping	our	judgment	and	actions	towards	others.	A	simple	categorization	of	others	
as	similar	to	oneself	or	different	(ingroup	vs	outgroup)	can	lead	to	ingroup	favouritism	and	
outgroup	 discrimination	 (Mullen,	 Brown,	 &	 Smith,	 1992;	 Tajfel,	 1982).	 In	 addition,	
stereotypes	about,	and	negative	associations	with,	a	person’s	race	or	gender	can	determine	
whether	they	will	be	offered	a	job	(Ziegert	&	Hanges,	2005),	how	much	they	get	paid	to	do	
that	 job	 (Wood,	 Corcoran,	 &	 Courant,	 1993),	 the	 quality	 of	 medical	 care	 they	 receive	
(Krieger	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Williams	 &	 Rucker,	 2000),	 the	 harshness	 of	 sentencing	 (Bowers,	
Sandys,	&	Brewer,	2003),	or	 simply	how	much	distance	other	people	will	keep	when	they	
are	waiting	at	the	bus	stop	(Dotsch	&	Wigboldus,	2008).	There	is	now	ample	evidence	that	
stereotypes	and	(implicit)	biases	influence	not	just	behavior,	but	also	perceptual	processes.	
Again,	 the	 majority	 of	 findings	 are	 related	 to	 visual	 perception.	 For	 example,	 Levin	 and	
Banaji	 (2006)	 demonstrate	 a	 striking	 visual	 illusion	 in	 which	 for	 two	 faces	 with	 identical	
luminance	characteristics,	the	face	with	African	American	facial	features	seems	darker	than	
the	face	with	European	features	(to	a	mixed	group	of	participants).	 In	another	example	of	
changes	 in	 visual	 perception,	 European	 Americans	 are	 faster	 to	 detect	 anger	 in	 African	
American	 than	 European	 faces	 (Hugenberg	&	 Bodenhausen,	 2003).	 This	 effect	 of	 race	 on	
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emotion	perception	does	not	 just	 rely	on	a	change	 in	 judgement	or	 responses:	 the	neural	
representation	of	the	emotion	is	altered	by	the	race	of	the	face	(Otten	&	Banaji,	2012).	 In	
this	study,	participants	watched	a	face	with	a	specific	emotional	expression	for	an	extended	
period	 of	 time.	 This	 leads	 to	 adaptation,	 such	 that	 a	 new	 angry	 face	 that	 is	 viewed	 after	
adapting	 to	 another	 angry	 face	 is	 judged	 to	 be	 less	 angry.	 This	 effect	 is	 thought	 to	 arise	
because	the	neurons	that	encode	a	specific	concept	(say	an	angry	face)	are	depleted	after	
extensive	stimulation,	 leading	to	smaller	neural	activation	for	the	same	concept	when	it	 is	
presented	 again	 (Watson	 &	 Clifford,	 2003).	 In	 the	 Otten	 and	 Banaji	 (2012)	 study,	 the	
emotion-adaptation	effects	were	smaller	when	 faces	differed	 in	 race	 than	when	the	 faces	
were	of	the	same	race	(but	not	when	they	differed	only	in	identity).	This	suggests	that	the	
neural	 representation	 of	 emotion	 differs	 depending	 on	 the	 race	 of	 a	 face,	 supporting	
findings	that	indicate	changes	in	emotion	perception	with	the	race	of	the	face.		In	another	
perceptual	 effect	 of	 race,	 participants	 are	more	 likely	 to	misperceive	 a	 tool	 as	 a	weapon	
after	 being	 primed	 with	 an	 African	 American	 face	 (see	 also	 Eberhardt,	 Goff,	 Purdie,	 &	
Davies,	2004;	Payne,	2001).	 In	a	 similar	vein,	participants	 taking	part	 in	a	 computer	game	
where	they	have	to	shoot	only	those	people	who	carry	a	gun	are	more	likely	to	accidentally	
shoot	 black	 computer	 avatars	 carrying	 tools	 than	 white	 avatars	 (Correll,	 Park,	 Judd,	 &	
Wittenbrink,	2002),	an	effect	that	also	holds	for	avatars	with	Muslim	headgear	(Unkelbach,	
Forgas,	&	Denson,	2008).	
	
So	 far	we	 have	 given	 an	 overview	 of	 studies	 that	 explored	 the	 interaction	 between	 high	
level	social	knowledge	and	low-level	perceptual	processes	(for	an	overview	of	the	effects	of	
non-social	high-level	factors	and	perception,	please	see	Vetter	&	Newen,	2014).	The	studies	
described	here	all	indicate	that	perception	can	be	altered	by	social	contextual	factors.	While	
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some	effects	described	here	could	also	be	attributed	to	post-perceptual	processes	such	as	
response-biases	 (see	 for	 example	 Klauer	 &	 Voss,	 2008),	 several	 studies	 provide	 evidence	
that	 conscious	 perception	 is	 directly	 altered	 by	 social	 context.	 Psychophysical	 paradigms	
such	 as	 binocular	 rivalry	 suggest	 that	 high-level	 social	 knowledge	 can	 influence	 visual	
perception	via	affecting	initial	sensory	processing	stages	(Anderson	et	al.,	2011;	Anderson	et	
al.,	 2011;	 Balcetis	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 A	 number	 of	 psychophysiological	 studies	 show	 that	 social	
contextual	 information	 can	 influence	 processes	 related	 to	 basic	 visual	 (Galli	 et	 al.,	 2006;	
Rahman,	2011;	Rahman	&	Sommer,	2012;	Wieser	et	al.,	 2014)	and	 linguistic	 (Regel	et	al.,	
2010)	perception.	Together,	these	studies	clearly	suggest	that	perceptual	processing	can	be	
directly	shaped	by	top-down	social	knowledge.		
	
Overall,	the	literature	on	social	perception	shows	highly	suggestive	evidence	for	changes	in	
perceptual	processes	based	on	higher-level	social	knowledge	and	context.	These	findings	sit	
uncomfortably	within	classical	models	of	perception	that	assume	bottom-up	processing	of	
sensory	 information	 which	 is	 independent	 of	 high-level	 cognitive	 factors.	 Below,	 we	 will	
contrast	 classical	 ‘bottom-up’	 models	 of	 perception	 with	 a	 predictive	 approach	 to	
perception	that	we	suggest	provides	a	valuable	theoretical	background	for	accommodating	
social	perceptual	effects,	and	for	deriving	novel	hypotheses.		
	
2. Predictive	perception	
The	 visual	 system	 is	 serially	 attuned	 to	 sensory	 processing:	 hierarchically	 low	 levels	 are	
preferentially	activated	by	local	details,	while	hierarchically	higher	level	visual	areas	respond	
to	 information	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 integrated	 and	 combined	 over	 larger	 visual	 angles	 (Van	
Essen,	Anderson,	&	Felleman,	1992;	Zeki	et	al.,	1991).	This	serial	architecture	has	been	the	
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basis	for	an	almost	implicit	assumption	that	visual	processing	is	a	serial,	bottom-up	process	
(Hochstein	&	Ahissar,	 2002;	Hubel	&	Wiesel,	 1968;	Perrett	&	Oram,	1993;	Riesenhuber	&	
Poggio,	 1999;	 Serre,	 Oliva,	 &	 Poggio,	 2007)	 where	 processing	 at	 successively	 ‘higher’	
hierarchical	 levels	 results	 in	 perceptual	 content	 which	 can	 be	 interpreted	 and	 integrated	
with	 other	 information	 already	 present	 in	 the	 cognitive	 system	 (see	 Figure	 1a	 for	 an	
illustration).	Within	such	a	framework,	perception	is	usually	understood	as	being	cognitively	
impenetrable	 (Pylyshyn,	 1999):	 high-level	 cognitive	 factors	 such	 as	 mental	 states	 and	
contextual	knowledge	do	not	and	cannot	affect	 the	 low-level	processing	of	 sensory	 input.	
Only	 at	 a	 later	 stage,	 when	 the	 perceptual	 content	 has	 been	 formed,	 can	 high-level	
cognition	exert	its	influence,	changing	for	example	the	interpretation	of	the	stimulus,	or	the	
way	 the	 perceiver	 responds	 to	 it.	 Such	 a	 framework	 cannot	 easily	 account	 for	 effects	
described	 above,	 specifically	 those	 studies	 that	 show	 psychophysiological	 or	
electrophysiological	evidence	that	the	perceiver’s	goals,	desires,	 inter-personal	and	group-
based	social	knowledge	can	change	even	the	early	stages	of	(visual)	perception.	
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Over	the	last	decade,	an	old	approach	to	how	the	brain	derives	perceptual	experience	from	
sensory	 input	 has	 gained	 renewed	 emphasis.	 This	 approach	 originates	 in	 the	 writings	 of	
Hermann	 von	 Helmholtz,	 the	 19
th
	 century	 scientist	 who	 published	 a	 ground-breaking	
treatise	 on	 visual	 perception	 Handbuch	 der	 Physiologischen	 Optik.	 In	 these	 volumes	 he	
introduces	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 brain	 constructs	 a	 mental	 representation	 of	 sensory	 input:	
through	unbewuster	Schluss,	or	unconscious	 inference,	by	which	pre-existing	psychological	
notions	 present	 in	 the	 mind	 of	 the	 perceiver	 automatically	 shape	 the	 percept	 that	 is	
generated	by	the	information	relayed	by	the	senses	(see	von	Helmholtz,	2005	for	a	recent	
reprint	of	this	work).		
	
This	idea	has	inspired	the	modern	concept	of	perception	as	predictive	processing	(Bar,	2007;	
Bar,	2007;	Clark,	2013;	Friston,	2009;	Friston,	2009;	Friston,	2010a;	Friston,	2010a;	Hohwy,	
Figure	 1:	 Schematic	 representation	 of	 a	 stimulus-
driven	model	of	perception	(panel	A),	where	prior	
knowledge	can	only	exert	an	effect	after	a	percept	
has	 been	 formed,	 and	 a	 model	 of	 a	 generative	
model	 of	 perception	 (panel	 B)	 where	 prior	
knowledge	 can	 influence	 perception	 through	
unconscious	inference	about	the	stimulus.	
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2013;	Kersten,	Mamassian,	&	Yuille,	2004;	Knill	&	Pouget,	2004;	Knill	&	Pouget,	2004),	which	
is	 emerging	 as	 a	 conceptually	 compelling	 and	 empirically	 fruitful	 framework	 in	 which	 to	
study	 human	 perception.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 will	 first	 describe	 the	 basic	 process	 of	
perceptual	 inference.	 The	 next	 section	 will	 describe	 the	 implementation	 of	 perceptual	
processing	in	a	hierarchical	architecture	such	as	the	brain.	
	
Put	simply,	predictive	processing	through	perceptual	inference	assumes	perceptual	content	
reflects	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 external	 hidden-causes	 that	 are	most	 likely	 to	 underlie	 a	
specific	pattern	of	sensory	activation.	For	deciphering	the	most	 likely	set	of	hidden	causes	
given	 a	 particular	 sensory	 situation	 (which	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	posterior)	 two	 sources	 of	
information	are	combined:	the	likelihood	and	the	prior.	The	likelihood	model	is	the	internal	
representation	 of	 sensory	 input.	 The	 prior	 reflects	 the	 initial	 hypothesis	 about	 the	 likely	
causes	of	sensory	 input,	before	any	 input	was	actually	encountered.	More	simply	put,	 the	
prior	represents	internal	expectations	about	the	causes	of	sensory	input.	Perceptual	priors	
are	assumed	to	depend	on	previous	experiences	and	knowledge	stored	in	memory,	as	well	
as	on	constraints	‘hard-wired’	through	evolution	and	development.	Combining	the	prior	and	
likelihood	estimates	through	(approximations	to)	Bayes’	theorem	yields	an	estimate	of	the	
posterior,	 which	 is	 assumed	 to	 specify	 perceptual	 content	 (see	 figure	 1b	 for	 a	 schematic	
view	of	predictive	perception).		
Figure	2	shows	an	 illustration	of	how	the	prior	and	 likelihood	are	combined	to	generate	a	
posterior	perceptual	 representation,	 for	a	simple	example	of	emotion	perception.	Arriving	
at	work,	imagine	that	you	see	a	glimpse	of	a	colleague’s	face	just	before	they	turn	back	to	
their	computer	screen.	This	quick	visual	impression	provides	sensory	input.	On	the	Bayesian	
view,	 your	 brain	 meets	 this	 bottom-up	 (or	 ‘outside-in’)	 sensory	 flow	 with	 top-down	 (or	
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‘inside-out’)	 expectations,	 based	 on	 context	 and	 memory.	 How	 sensory	 data	 and	 prior	
expectation	are	combined	depends	critically	on	the	relative	precision	of	these	factors.	In	our	
example,	 low	precision	priors	may	 reflect	 relatively	weak	expectations	–	 for	example	 that	
people	are	overall	slightly	more	likely	to	display	a	happy	expression	than	a	sad	expression.		
Precision	 in	sensory	data	 is	a	function	of	 its	reliability	–	unambiguous	sensory	data	will	be	
afforded	high	precision,	as	compared	to	noisy	or	otherwise	ambiguous	data.			
	
Panel	2A	show	what	happens	when	a	low	precision	internal	prior	for	happiness	is	combined	
with	high	precision	sensory	evidence	for	happiness.	The	resulting	posterior	for	a	happy	facial	
expression	has	high	precision,	underlying	a	clear	perceptual	content	signalling	a	happy	face.	
If	this	same	low	precision	prior	for	happiness	is	combined	with	high	precision	evidence	for	
an	 unhappy	 facial	 expression,	 as	 illustrated	 in	 panel	 2B,	 the	 posterior	 now	 indicates	
unhappiness	due	to	the	strong	relative	contribution	of	the	high	precision	likelihood.	
	
In	cases	2A	and	2B,	priors	do	not	play	a	large	role	in	perceptual	inference	because	they	have	
low	precision	compared	to	the	sensory	evidence.	But	priors	are	not	always	this	weak,	and	
perceptual	evidence	 is	not	always	perceived	or	encoded	so	clearly.	 If	we	consider	another	
colleague	whose	paper	was	 just	 accepted	 in	 a	 high	 impact	 journal,	 you	may	 apply	 a	 very	
high	 precision	 prior	 for	 positive	 emotional	 manifestations	 (as	 illustrated	 in	 2C	 and	 2D).	
When	 these	 precise	 priors	 are	 combined	with	 relatively	weak	 (low	precision)	 visual	 input	
(despite	the	high	 impact	publication,	your	colleague	still	 resides	 in	a	dark	basement	office	
with	 poor	 lighting),	 the	 priors	will	 have	 a	 large	 influence	 on	 the	 posterior	 and	 hence	 the	
resulting	perceptual	content.	Figure	2C	illustrates	how	a	low-precision	sensory	input	signal	
can	underlie	a	clear	perceptual	conclusion	when	combined	with	a	high	precision	prior:	even	
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though	the	badly	lit	office	presents	only	imprecise	visual	signals	reflecting	your	colleague’s	
smiling	 face,	 the	 strong	 resulting	 perceptual	 content	 (the	 posterior)	 is	 boosted	 to	 high	
precision	by	the	strong	prior.	Finally,	example	2D	illustrates	how	strong	prior	expectations	
can	change	perception:	here,	the	 low	precision	sensory	 input	signals	a	negative	emotional	
expression.	However,	combined	with	the	high	precision	‘accepted-article	induced’	prior	for	
happiness,	 the	 posterior,	 and	 thus	 the	 perceptual	 content,	 settles	 on	 a	 neutral	 facial	
expression.	 Example	 2D	 indicates	 that	 expectations	have	 the	potential	 to	 shift	 perceptual	
content,	given	the	right	balance	between	prior	and	likelihood.	
	
In	examples	2B	and	2D,	the	prior	(representing	the	top-down	predictions)	and	the	likelihood	
function	(representing	the	bottom-up	sensory	signal)	differ	from	each	other.		Most	versions	
Figure	2:	Four	examples	showing	how,	following	Bayesian	computation,	different	qualities	in	sensory	input	
(the	 likelihood)	and	 internal	predictions	(the	prior)	 influence	perceptual	outcomes	 (the	posterior).	 In	 the	
top	panels	the	expectations	are	weak	and	bottom-up	 input	 is	precise,	 so	perceived	emotion	 is	driven	by	
sensory	 input.	 The	 bottom	 panels	 show	 the	 reverse	 situation	 (weak	 input,	 high	 precision	 predictions),	
causing	internal	expectations	to	be	the	main	driver	of	emotion	perception.	
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of	predictive	processing	propose	that	such	a	difference	between	top-down	predictions	and	
bottom-up	 input	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 prediction	 error	 signal.	 Moreover,	 they	 assert	 that	
perceptual	inference	is	implemented	through	minimization	of	these	prediction	error	signals	
(Bastos	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Rao	 &	 Ballard,	 1999).	 Inference	 via	 prediction	 error	 minimization	 is	
assumed	to	take	place	over	multiple	 levels	of	perceptual	and	cognitive	processing,	so	that	
posteriors	at	one	 level	 form	priors	for	the	 level	 immediately	below	(Friston,	2009;	Friston,	
2010b;	Hohwy,	2012).		In	a	hierarchical	scheme,	if	prediction	errors	at	one	level	cannot	be	
sufficiently	minimized	by	predictions	from	the	layer	immediately	above,	prediction	error	will	
percolate	upward	 through	 the	 system	 (see	 Fig.	 3).	 This	 propagation	of	 the	error	 signal	 to	
higher	 levels	will	 lead	to	updating	of	successively	higher-order	 (and	thus	more	abstract	or	
conceptual)	 priors.	 This	 in	 turn	 gives	 rise	 to	 new	 sets	 of	 perceptual	 predictions	 flowing	
downwards	through	the	hierarchy.		
	
	
Altogether,	the	framework	of	predictive	processing	shows	how	high-level	cognitive	content	
can	 play	 a	 constitutive	 role	 in	 perception,	 by	 participating	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 prior	
beliefs	 and	 likelihood	 functions	 that	 constrain	 perceptual	 inference	 across	 multiple	
Figure	3:	A	hierarchical	model	of	predictive	processing.	High	level	neural	
nodes	encode	the	internally	generated	expectations	about	the	nature	of	
the	 input	 (the	 prior).	 These	 expectations	 are	 transmitted	 down	 to	 the	
lower	 levels.	 The	 difference	between	 the	prior	 and	 the	 sensory	 input	 is	
subsequently	 computed,	 resulting	 in	 an	 error	 signal.	 This	 error	 signal	 is	
transmitted	 from	 the	 lower	 level	 to	 higher	 cortical	 levels,	 and	 used	 to	
adjust	the	prior	at	every	level.		
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hierarchical	 levels.	 It	 is	 the	 pre-existing	 cognitive	 context,	 including	memories,	 goals	 and	
emotional	 states	 and	 preceding	 social	 experience,	 which	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 priors.	
During	perception,	 these	priors	 are	 integrated	with	 the	 likelihood	of	 the	 sensory	 input	 to	
generate	 the	 (posterior)	 percept.	 As	 such,	 the	 predictive	 process	 is	 doing	 most	 of	 the	
perceptual	 ‘heavy	 lifting’	 while	 the	 sensory	 input	 is	 providing	 ongoing	 feedback	 or	
‘prediction	error’	signalling	the	mismatch	between	current	actual	and	predicted	activity	at	
each	hierarchical	level	(Clark,	2013;	Hohwy,	2007).	
	
In	 recent	years,	 the	predictive	processing	view	of	perception	has	been	usefully	applied	 to	
visual	perception	(Yuille	&	Kersten,	2006),	attention	(Chikkerur,	Serre,	Tan,	&	Poggio,	2010;	
Feldman	&	Friston,	2010;	Rao,	2005),	 interoception	 (Seth,	 2013),	 action	 (Adams,	 Shipp,	&	
Friston,	 2013;	 Shipp,	Adams,	&	 Friston,	 2013)	 and	decision	making	 (Beck	 et	 al.,	 2008).	Of	
most	 relevance	 to	 the	 present	 discussion,	 the	 framework	 has	 also	 been	 applied	 to	 highly	
social	aspects	of	human	functioning.	For	example,	the	mirror	neuron	system,	an	important	
part	of	the	neural	circuitry	underlying	the	ability	to	understand	the	actions	of	others,	can	be	
understood	as	an	action-prediction	system	(Kilner,	Friston,	&	Frith,	2007a;	Kilner,	Friston,	&	
Frith,	 2007b).	 Brain	 areas	 involved	 in	 ‘Theory	 of	Mind’,	 the	 process	 of	 understanding	 the	
thoughts,	goals	and	intentions	of	others,	behave	in	ways	that	are	consistent	with	predictive	
processing	(Koster-Hale	&	Saxe,	2013).	More	generally,	it	seems	that	a	predictive	processing	
approach	 is	 useful	 to	 understand	 how	 people	 are	 able	 to	 perceive	 others’	mental	 states	
(Hohwy	&	Palmer,	2014;	Palmer,	Seth,	&	Hohwy,	2015).	Human	communication	also	seems	
to	involve	predictive	processing.	Perception	of	spoken	and	written	words	is	highly	sensitive	
to	contextual	cues	and	top-down	knowledge,	findings	that	are	difficult	to	account	for	within	
a	traditional	bottom-up	framework	of	language	perception,	but	which	are	compatible	with	a	
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hierarchical	 predictive	 view	 of	 language	 processing	 (Farmer,	 Brown,	&	 Tanenhaus,	 2013).	
Moreover,	 it	has	been	suggested	that	 it	 is	precisely	because	we	are	predictive	agents	that	
we	are	able	to	communicate	with	other,	similarly	predictive	agents	(Friston	&	Frith,	2015).	
Along	 these	 lines,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 too	 little	 reliance	 on	 priors	 (for	 example	 in	
autism:	 Lawson,	 Rees,	 &	 Friston,	 2014;	 Palmer	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Pellicano	 &	 Burr,	 2012;	
Quattrocki	&	Friston,	2014;	Van	de	Cruys	et	al.,	2014)	hampers	effective	social	functioning.	
These	examples	illustrate	the	explanatory	potential	that	the	predictive	processing	approach	
has	for	modelling	and	explaining	social	aspects	of	human	cognition.		
	
The	 distinctive	 potential	 of	 a	 predictive	 processing	 perspective	 can	 be	 highlighted	 by	
contrasting	it	with	other	frameworks	in	social	cognitive	science.	For	example,	the	grounded	
cognition	 perspective	 postulates	 that	 (social)	 cognition	 is	 the	 result	 of	 simulation	 or	 re-
enactment	taking	 into	account	stored	knowledge	from	all	modalities,	which	 include	visual,	
tactile,	 sensory,	 and	 movement	 information	 (Barsalou,	 2008;	 Decety	 &	 Grezes,	 2006;	
Goldman,	 2006;	 Meyer	 &	 Damasio,	 2009).	 Because	 cognition	 directly	 relies	 on	 previous	
experiences	stored	 in	memory,	 the	model	 leaves	ample	room	for	direct	 top-down	effects.	
However,	 unlike	 predictive	 processing,	 grounded	 cognition	 models	 assume	 that	 internal	
behavioural	 simulations	 only	 become	 relevant	 after	 initial	 sensory	 processing	 has	 been	
conducted	(Barsalou,	2003;	Meyer	&	Damasio,	2009).	This	means	that	grounded	cognition	
does	 not	 provide	 a	 powerful	 framework	 in	 which	 to	 interpret	 the	 findings	 reviewed	 in	
section	 1,	 which	 show	 that	 initial	 sensory	 processing	 is	 influenced	 by	 social	 context.	 In	
contrast,	a	predictive	processing	approach	to	perception	and	cognition	provides	a	neurally	
plausible	description	of	how	simulation	processes	that	are	the	key	component	of	grounded	
cognition	might	be	implemented	in	the	brain:	not	as	full	scale	simulations,	but	as	internally	
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generated	 predictions	 based	 on	 knowledge	 gained	 from	 previous	 (bodily)	 experiences	
(Barrett	&	Simmons,	2015;	Seth,	2013).		
	
3. Implications	for	social	perception	
As	 described	 above,	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 predictive	 processing	 framework	 is	 that	 prior	
experience	 and	 existing	 knowledge	 constrains	 predictions	 about	 the	 causes	 of	 current	
sensory	 inputs.	 By	 combining	 priors	 with	 the	 actual	 sensory	 input,	 perceptual	 content	 is	
specified.	Within	such	a	framework,	desires,	goals,	emotional	states	and	individual	or	group-
level	 social	 knowledge	 about	 others	 all	 have	 a	 potential
1
	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 perceptual	
predictions	that	are	generated	by	the	system.	It	is	through	these	predictions	that	high-level	
social	factors	can	directly	shape	perception.		
	
The	usefulness	of	the	predictive	processing	framework	for	social	psychology	is	not	just	that	
it	 provides	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 explains	 in	 general	 terms	 how	 high-level	 social	
knowledge	can	 influence	perception.	The	 framework	also	provides	an	 impetus	 to	advance	
the	 theoretical	and	experimental	work	 focussing	on	social	 cognition.	Next,	we	will	outline	
four	experimental	hypotheses	to	illustrate	how	a	predictive	processing	framework	can	help	
develop	and	answer	social	psychological	questions.	
	
3.1 From	active	inference	to	social	action	
																																								 																				
1
	Obviously,	social	states	and	knowledge	can	only	influence	perception	if	they	have	
predictive	value	for	the	perceiver.	For	example,	being	angry	might	make	a	perceiver	more	
susceptible	for	violence	related	cues	if	that	perceiver	has	often	associated	anger	with	
violence,	while	it	might	make	another	perceiver	more	susceptible	to	food	related	cues,	since	
that	perceiver	has	associated	anger	and	binge-eating	in	the	past.	These	differences	will	
prescribe	different	actions,	which	in	term	will	reduce	interoceptive	predictions	errors	and	
promote	long-run	physiological	homeostasis	(Seth,	2015)	
	 21	
A	 central	 aim	 for	 social	 psychology	 is	 to	 study	 individual	 social	 actions	 and	 interpersonal	
interaction.	 The	 predictive	 processing	 framework	 provides	 an	 interesting	 perspective	 on	
human	 action	 (Friston,	 Daunizeau,	 Kilner,	&	 Kiebel,	 2010):	 actions	 are	 generated	 through	
the	 fulfilment	 of	 internal	 (proprioceptive)	 predictions,	 and	 can	 be	 deployed	 to	 minimize	
sensory	 prediction	 errors	 (e.g.,	 if	 you	 expect	 to	 see	 John,	 move	 your	 eyes	 until	 John	
appears).	Minimization	of	prediction	error	through	action	is	called	‘active	inference’	(Friston	
et	 al,	 2010).	 Currently,	 the	 active	 inference	 model	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 basic	 forms	 of	
behaviour,	such	as	oculomotor	control	(Adams,	Perrinet,	&	Friston,	2012)	and	simple	goal-
directed	decision-making	(Solway	&	Botvinick,	2012).	With	regards	to	social	behaviour,	the	
idea	of	active	 inference	suggests	 that	people	are	 likely	 to	employ	actions	 to	confirm	their	
social	preconceptions.	These	actions	could	be	obviously	social	 in	nature,	such	as	physically	
avoiding	someone	or	instigating	an	interaction	with	other	people,	but	they	could	also	be	not	
specifically	 social,	 such	 as	 instigating	 an	 eye	 movement	 or	 re-focussing	 attention.	 As	 a	
concrete	 example,	 the	 active	 inference	 framework	 predicts	 that	 people	 with	 strong	
(implicit)	 gender	 stereotypes	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 search	 for	 evidence	 that	 confirms	 their	
predictions	 (a	 woman	 doing	 something	 a	 mother	 would	 do)	 than	 for	 evidence	 that	
disconfirms	their	predictions	(a	woman	doing	something	a	leader	would	do),	or	act	in	ways	
that	 will	 elicit	 stereotype-consistent	 behaviour	 from	 others.	 These	 predictions	 are	 in	 line	
with	 experimental	 observations	 from	 Hollingshead	 and	 Fraidin	 (2003),	 who	 showed	 that	
people	 in	 a	 collective	 memorization	 task	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 choose	 gender-consistent	
memory	 categories	 (soap-operas	 for	 women,	 cars	 for	 men)	 over	 a	 neutral	 category	
(geography)	when	working	with	a	partner	from	the	opposite	gender.		
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Future	research	could	also	examine	whether	the	existence	of	competing	social	priors	leads	
to	 (social)	 actions	 that	 best	 disambiguate	 these	 priors,	 rather	 than	 actions	 which	 are	
deployed	to	confirm	a	specific	prior	belief	as	suggested	above.	This	prediction	rest	on	the	
notion	of	counterfactual	predictive	processing,	whereby	predictive	models	encode	not	only	
the	likely	causes	of	current	sensory	signals,	but	also	the	likely	causes	of	sensory	signals	that	
are	predicted	to	occur	given	specific	actions		(Friston,	Adams,	Perrinet,	&	Breakspear,	2012;	
Seth,	 2014).	 These	 ideas	 have	only	 recently	 been	 applied	 in	 social	 settings	 (Palmer	 et	 al.,	
2015),	suggesting	that	counterfactual	predictions	combined	with	active	inference	has	strong	
theoretical	potential.	
	
Moreover,	future	research	could	test	whether	social	active	inference	is	closely	coupled	with	
perceptual	effects,	 i.e.,	whether	those	 individuals	who	show	strongest	modulation	of	their	
perception	 through	 social	 stereotypes	 also	 show	 strongest	modulation	 of	 their	 behaviour	
through	 social	 stereotypes.	 Indeed,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 people	 who	 show	 strong	 influence	 of	
priors	 in	basic	perceptual	processes	 (evidenced,	 for	example,	by	a	strong	susceptibility	 for	
top-down	induced	perceptual	illusions)	may	also	show	a	similarly	strong	influence	of	priors	
on	social	perception.		
	
One	 important	 consequence	 of	 active	 inference	 is	 sensory	 attenuation:	 a	 reduction	 of	
attention	to	the	sensory	consequences	of	self-generated	behaviour	(Brown,	Adams,	Parees,	
Edwards,	&	Friston,	2013).	Sensory	attenuation	can	be	easily	illustrated	if	your	try	to	tickle	
yourself:	this	is	much	less	effective	than	when	someone	else	tickles	you.	If	social	behaviour	
is	 indeed	 a	 form	 of	 active	 inference,	 then	 we	 may	 expect	 to	 find	 similar	 ‘sensory’	
attenuation	 for	 self-related	 consequences	 of	 social	 actions.	 Thus,	 perhaps	 our	 scary	 story	
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scares	the	listeners	but	not	us,	because	of	‘social	sensory	attenuation’.	And	perhaps	the	hurt	
we	 inflict	 on	 another	 person	 does	 not	 allows	 us	 to	 empathize	 in	 the	 way	 we	 would	 be	
moved	 by	 similar,	 but	 other-inflicted,	 pain	 to	 that	 some	 person.	 The	 empathic	 response	
could	be	reduced	through	sensory	attenuation.	However,	such	a	reduction	in	empathy	could	
also	be	attributed	to	a	cognitive	strategy	in	which	the	hurter	justifies	his/her	behaviour	by	
asserting	that	the	consequences	are	simply	not	that	bad	because	we	are	already	attuned	to	
the	 consequences	 of	 our	 own	 actions.	 Future	 research	 could	 explore	 whether	 our	 own	
actions	 indeed	 make	 us	 less	 sensitive	 to	 the	 sensory/perceptual	 consequences	 of	 these	
actions.	
	
3.2 Deriving	hypotheses	about	neural	patterns	of	activation	
The	predictive	processing	approach	provides	a	 strong	 insight	 into	how	neural	populations	
respond	 to	 sensory	 information	 that	 (does	 not)	 fit	 an	 internal	 prediction.	 Compared	 to	
unpredicted	stimuli,	predictable	and	thus	redundant	neural	activation	is	supressed	early	on	
in	the	processing	stream	(Rao	&	Ballard,	1999).	Therefore,	 the	representation	of	expected	
sensory	input	is	sparse,	but	highly	efficient	 	(Jehee,	Rothkopf,	Beck,	&	Ballard,	2006).	Even	
though	 the	 resulting	 neural	 activation	 for	 unexpected	 sensory	 stimulation	 appears	 more	
widespread	(since	there	is	less	predicted	activation	to	be	supressed),	it	will	be	less	efficient	
at	representing	the	sensory	input	than	the	activation	for	expected	stimuli	(Kok,	Jehee,	&	de	
Lange,	2012;	Koster-Hale	&	Saxe,	2013).		
If	at	in	a	specific	area	of	the	brain,	expected	stimuli	give	rise	to	a	pattern	of	activation	that	is	
more	 informative	 (for	 example	 in	 a	 MVPA	 analysis,	 Kok	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 	 than	 unpredicted	
stimuli,	this	suggests	that	priors	influence	the	representation	of	the	stimulus.	If	on	the	other	
hand	 expected	 and	 unexpected	 stimuli	 are	 equally	 informative,	 then	 the	 neural	
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representation	seems	purely	based	on	bottom-up	input,	not	on	top-down	predictions.	This	
provides	a	powerful	tool	to	explore	at	which	neural	 level	social	predictions	provide	strong	
priors,	and	at	which	level	they	do	not.		Some	social	cues	might	provide	low	level	priors,	such	
as	that	a	violence	related	cue	might	activate	a	dark	hue	prior	when	you	are	anticipating	to	
see	a	face	(Eberhardt	et	al.,	2004).	This	should	thus	be	reflected	in	a	more	efficient	pattern	
of	neural	activation	to	expected	than	unexpected	colouring	in	the	earliest	colour	processing	
levels	 of	 the	 visual	 processing	 system	 (V3).	 However,	 many	 social	 priors	 might	 only	 be	
informative	at	slightly	higher	 levels	of	sensory	processing.	For	example	 in	the	case	of	your	
happy	 colleague	 (examples	 2C	 and	2D),	 it	 is	more	 likely	 that	 predictions	 about	 emotional	
content	of	the	input	are	represented	in	the	fusiform	face	area,	or	the	amygdala	(Vuilleumier	
&	Pourtois,	2007).	By	exploring	at	which	level	the	neural	activation	patterns	are	in	line	with	
a	predictive	processing	account,	and	at	which	level	they	do	not,	we	can	thus	not	only	learn	
that	the	brain	generates	its	own	hypotheses	about	the	input,	but	also	at	which	neural	levels	
these	hypotheses	are	used	to	generate	priors	about	the	expected	sensory	input.	
	
3.3 Changing	priors	through	experience	
The	predictive	processing	 framework	proposes	that	current	priors	are	continually	updated	
based	on	feedback	from	sensory	 input,	 in	order	to	optimize	future	perceptual	predictions.	
Interestingly,	current	research	on	social	priors	suggest	that	when	new	information	is	highly	
personally	 relevant,	 the	 corresponding	 priors	 appear	more	 difficult	 to	 shift.	 For	 example,	
when	 estimating	 their	 future	 chance	 of	 divorce	 or	 cancer,	 people	 tend	 to	 discount	
information	that	is	more	negative	than	their	existing	estimate	(Sharot,	Korn,	&	Dolan,	2011).	
Beliefs	about	one’s	own	 IQ	and	appearance	are	also	surprisingly	stable,	at	 least	when	the	
new	 information	 is	 unflattering	 for	 the	 individual	 (positive	 information	 is	 integrated	 into	
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one's	 personal	 beliefs,	 Eil	&	Rao,	 2011).	 This	 suggests	 a	mechanism	 that	maintains	 stable	
self-related	social	priors,	even	in	the	presence	of	(overwhelming)	counterevidence.		
	
Future	 research	 could	 explore	 whether	 other	 social	 priors	 show	 similar	 characteristics,	
perhaps	by	systematically	 ignoring	 information	 that	 is	not	 in	 line	with	pre-existing	beliefs.	
For	example,	people	with	strong	negative	associations	with	African-Americans	(Greenwald,	
Nosek,	&	Banaji,	 2003)	might	have	negative	expectations	 about	 the	behaviour	of	African-
American	people	in	general.	Positive	behaviour	of	African	American	individuals	(say,	always	
sharing	 their	money	 in	 an	 iterative	 prisoner’s	 dilemma),	 should	 change	 the	 priors	 of	 the	
prejudiced	 individual	 to	 a	 more	 positive	 expectation.	 If	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 i.e.,	 if	 the	
relevant	 social	 priors	 are	 not	 updated	 (or	 updated	 to	 a	 smaller	 extent	 than	 for	 non-
prejudiced	individuals),	this	shows	that	prejudice	not	only	affects	one’s	priors	but	also	the	
how	these	priors	are	updated.		
	
Moreover,	 if	 phenomena	 like	 this	 are	 observed,	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	 examine	 the	
underlying	 causes.	 It	may	be	 that	 social	 priors	 have	 an	 inherent	high	precision-weighting,	
more	 than	 non-social	 priors.	 It	 is	 also	 possible	 that	 active	 inference	 (section	 3.1)	 leads	
individuals	 to	 under-sample	 inconvenient	 information	 that	 does	 not	 fit	 their	 core	 world	
views.		
	
	
4.	Conclusion	
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After	 a	 hiatus,	 social	 psychology	 has	 again	 turned	 its	 focus	 to	 exploring	 the	 interaction	
between	 high-level	 social	 knowledge	 and	 basic	 perceptual	 processing.	 At	 this	 point,	
evidence	 is	 mounting	 that	 a	 person’s	 desires	 and	 moods,	 and	 their	 knowledge	 about	
individuals	and	groups,	can	shape	perceptual	content.	Adopting	a	view	of	human	perception	
as	a	predictive	process,	that	relies	on	internally	generated	predictions	or	priors,	can	not	only	
explain	 how	 social	 knowledge	 can	 directly	 and	 seamlessly	 influence	 perception	 and	
consciousness;	it	also	provides	exciting	new	avenues	for	research	and	scientific	exploration	
of	social	perception	and	social	action.	
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